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X.—*Is there Still a Latin Potential?*

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In the third paper in Vol. VI of the *Cornell Studies in Classical Philology*, 1898, Professor Elmer discusses “The Supposed Potential Use of the Subjunctive Mood.” His aim, as he says on the opening page, is “to show that there is no use of the subjunctive mood in Latin which offers any justification for the use of the term ‘Potential’ and that this term ought to be dropped altogether from Latin grammars.”

Now I myself, both in my teaching at Cornell and in certain writings,¹ have urged, or implied, that the application of the term should be narrowed to the natural limits suggested by its meaning, and that a different name should be given to the clearly different subjunctive in assertions that something *would in a certain event (certainly) happen*, etc. Mr. Elmer, in the *American Journal of Philology*, XV. 3 (October, 1894), has since said the same thing in

¹ So in the nomenclature and classification in my “Cum-Constructions,” *Cornell University Studies in Classical Philology*, Vol I, 1888, p. 88 (German edition, p. 98) and pp. 106 and 107 (German edition, p. 120), followed by Mr. Elmer in his edition of the *Phormio*, 1895, in notes to 488, 597, 770, and 1030; similarly in the divisions in my (unpublished) Syllabus of the Constructions of the Latin Subjunctive, used by my students at Cornell, and later in Chicago. So again, quite explicitly, in my “‘Extended’ and ‘Remote’ Deliberatives in Greek,” *Transactions of the American Philological Association*, Vol. XXIV, 1893, p. 200, as follows: “To some of my readers, this division of the non-wishing optative into two classes will have no weight, and the argument founded upon it will have no justification. . . . The distinction, nevertheless, has long seemed to me not only a real, but an important one. There is a vital difference between ‘I can’ and ‘in a certain event I surely should,’ between ‘he may perhaps’ and ‘he surely would.’ If we should not tolerate a translation in which ‘might’ was used where the idea was ‘would,’ or *vice versa*, no more should we be indifferent to the same difference in the exposition of Greek or Latin syntax.”

print independently, as follows: "The term 'potential' ought, it seems to me, to be limited to expressions of ability and possibility—to the 'can' and the 'may' ideas. I see nothing in the term 'potential' that makes it appropriate for designating any other construction."

For the use of the Subjunctive which had previously been inexactly classed in all books with the Potential, I proposed the name "Subjunctive of Ideal Certainty"¹; for the Subjunctive, in this use, asserts as fully, and with as strong a feeling of certainty, as the Indicative,—and yet does not assert a fact. Professor Bennett has devised a phrase which is meant to be an improvement upon this; namely, the "Subjunctive of Contingent Futurity." I will not stop to urge that the phrase Contingent Futurity applies as well to the Future or Future Perfect Indicative in a conclusion (and in many other cases) as to the Present or Perfect Subjunctive, and that a name that will apply equally well to two moods cannot have hit the essential nature of either. It is sufficient for my immediate purpose to have explained the meaning of one of the phrases to which I shall have presently to refer.

¹ "Cum-Constructions" and "Anticipatory Subjunctive," mentioned below.

For my Cornell Syllabus in its early form, I devised the phrase Predicative Subjunctive, and thought it good, inasmuch as the Subjunctive in this use *asserts* as completely as the Indicative does. This term, under the form "Predicating Subjunctive," was adopted by Mr. Elmer in the notes referred to above, and was attributed to me. It has the fault, however, of not excluding the true Potential, which likewise asserts. The two modal uses are very close to each other; but there is, at their extremes ("may" and "would"), an essential difference between them. The phrase Subjunctive of Ideal Certainty, as against the phrase Potential Subjunctive or Subjunctive of Possibility, is intended to bring out this difference on the one hand, and the difference from the side of the Indicative (the Mood of Actuality) on the other.

Schmalz, in the last edition of his Latin Syntax (Stoltz und Schmalz, *Lat. Gramm.*² 1900) cites the term, together with my general scheme of the classification of the uses of the Latin Subjunctive (published in my "Anticipatory Subjunctive in Greek and Latin," preprinted in 1894 from the *University of Chicago Studies in Classical Philology*, Vol. I), along with Lattmann's scheme. Delbrück also cites it, in his treatment of the Potential Optative, *Vergleich. Syntax d. Indogerm. Sprachen*, IV, 371 (1897), to distinguish the use meant from the true Potential use of the Optative. This is a gain, though neither of the two writers as yet adopts the term as the regular designation of a category. Brugmann, *Griech. Gramm.*³ 1900, still uses the term Potential only.

Thus far Mr. Elmer and I were in substantial harmony, and I was glad to have company, even though my presence was not recognized. But when, on taking up the volume referred to, I found that Mr. Elmer was now setting out to rout the Potential utterly and drive it out of the Grammars, I was no longer with him. It was therefore with relief that I saw Professor Bennett come to the rescue in Vol. IX of the *Cornell Studies*. Mr. Bennett has, it seems to me, successfully shown the untenableness of Mr. Elmer's position.¹ But he has left several things unsaid; and these I propose to touch upon briefly in the present paper.

Mr. Elmer holds that examples of the *aliquis dixerit* type are all to be taken as Future Perfect Indicatives, since the equivalent expressions with *fortasse* in the unambiguous (Future) forms are in the Indicative, unless the meaning of the mood itself is that of Contingent Futurity ("perhaps would").² The conclusion, he thinks (p. 188), is strengthened by the case of examples of the *roget quis* or *aliquis dicat* type. These are, with one exception, to be taken as Volitive Conditions, the meaning being (*let some one*, i.e.) *suppose some one says to me so and so: my reply will be so and so*. The Latin habit, he thinks, suppresses the "my reply will be," and simply gives the reply itself. The one exception, *dicat fortassis aliquis*, from Pliny *N. H.*, 36, 2, 2, he takes as an expression of Contingent Futurity, and translates by "*to this remark some one would perhaps rejoin*," warning his readers from supposing "that the presence here of *fortassis* can lend the slightest support to the theory that *dicat* means 'may say.'" The examples like *videas* and *videres*, commonly taken to mean *one may see* and *one might see*, really mean, he thinks, "*one would see if one should be present*," "*one would have seen*

¹ Mr. Elmer thinks not. See his "Should the May-Potential use of the Subjunctive be recognized in Latin?", *Classical Review*, XIV, 4. Cf. also Professor Clement's "Two Notes on the Latin Subjunctive," *ibid.*

² "And as soon as one admits that we have the future-perfect indicative in these seven instances of the type *aliquis fortasse dixerit*, one must admit that we have that mood in all those of *aliquis dixerit*, without *fortasse*; for the expressions without *fortasse* clearly represent exactly the same modal use as those with *fortasse*" (Elmer, p. 187).

if one had been present,” and thus are likewise expressions of Contingent Futurity. Hor. *Carm.* 2, 1, 15, does not mean “not every poet can describe,” but, as Mr. Elmer translates, “for it is not every (any) chance poet *that would succeed* in describing,” etc. Similarly, other examples of various kinds are reduced to recognized non-Potential categories. There are therefore no Potentials left in the language.

Mr. Bennett, in Vol. IX, discusses Mr. Elmer’s individual examples, and makes it clear that the latter’s interpretations of them as Volitive Conditions or expressions of Contingent Futurity are forced¹; rightly insists (apropos of the examples with *videas* and the like) that a “jussive” cannot be used in a Condition unless the jussive meaning is still clearly apparent; and defends the text *fors et* in Hor. *Carm.* 1, 28, 33. My treatment will cover additional ground, as follows:

i. Mr. Elmer denies the existence of a “can” or “could” Potential, and, in the very act of doing so, translates *describat* as “would succeed in describing.” Now to say that a man

¹ At one point of his argument I differ from Mr. Bennett. Mr. Elmer had quoted Donatus and Euphrasius as understanding the Terence example *atque aliquis dicat* as an instance of a volitive. Mr. Bennett seeks to meet this as follows: “What evidence is there that either of them was competent to pass sober judgment upon such a point? If we assume that they were either or both competent and well-qualified judges of the matter in controversy, what shall we say of Priscian? His authority ought to carry at least as much weight as that of Donatus and Euphrasius. Yet he gives us the most fantastic interpretations of the modal force of various Latin subjunctives. Thus (Keil, iii, p. 252) he declares that Horace’s *scripserit* in *Carm.* 1, 6, 14:—

Quis Martem tunica tectum adamantina
Digne scripserit?

is for *scribere potuerit*, a ‘could’ potential!” (The exclamation point is Mr. Bennett’s.) Now it is perfectly true that the Roman grammarians need a good deal of watching. But it is also sure, to my mind, that Priscian’s interpretation of this particular example is sound. Indeed, there could hardly be a better instance of the true “could”-potential. I should be glad to know how Mr. Bennett would interpret the passage, and such corresponding Greek examples as *Od.* 3, 113:—

τίς κεν ἔκεινα πάντα γε μυθήσαιτο καταθητῶν ἀνθρώπων;

where is the mortal man that could recount them all? (Palmer’s Translation), or who of mortal men could tell the tale? (Butcher and Lang’s Translation).

would succeed in doing a thing (meaning, of course, if he tried), is to say that he is *capable* of doing it,—that he *can* do it, or *could* do it. Mr. Elmer has accordingly himself reinstated the “can” or “could” Potential.

But the construction, if it existed at all, would not stop here. A “can” or “could” Potential would be sure to beget a “may” or “might” Potential. *Hic aliquis dicat*, starting with the meaning “at this point some one could interpose an objection,” would soon acquire the meaning “at this point some one may interpose an objection.” So here, in spite of Mr. Elmer’s pitchfork, Nature herself comes back, and brings the Potential with her.¹

2. There is clear evidence that the Romans possessed, at any rate, the exact *kind* of construction which Mr. Elmer denies for the *aliquis dicat* type, and that they employed it in the same way. Whatever be the origin of the construction with *forsitan* (see below, p. 155, for a fuller discussion), the total effect of *forsitan* plus a Subjunctive is Potential. Mr. Elmer himself says, p. 179, footnote, “so with *forsitan quaeratis* the entire expression practically means ‘perhaps you may ask.’” Now *forsitan* and a Subjunctive are frequently used in exactly the same relation to the main sentence as that in which *roget quis*, *aliquis dicat*, etc., are used in Mr. Elmer’s seven examples. So it is, for instance, in this very case of *forsitan quaeratis*, Cic. *Rosc. Am.* 2, 5. The meaning “in case you do ask, my answer will be” is of course involved. So is the same meaning, *mutatis mutandis*, in Cic. *Off.* 3, 6, 29 (*forsitan quispiam dixerit*); Verg. *Aen.* 2, 506 (*forsitan*

¹ The one contention which, upon Mr. Elmer’s procedure, was open to him, was that, through the idea exemplified in “would describe, if he should try” (better yet through phrases like *vix* or *facile describat*), arose the idea “would succeed in describing, if he should try,” and, out of this, the “could describe” idea, which then gave rise to the “may” idea. In other words, taking the step that he does in his interpretation of *describat*, his legitimate procedure would then have been to develop a true Potential Subjunctive out of a Subjunctive of Ideal Certainty. He would thus have avoided denying at one point the existence of a force which at another he has practically asserted. I do not myself, however, think that this is the actual history of the relations of the Potential Subjunctive and the Subjunctive of Ideal Certainty.

requiras); Ov. *Ep. ex Pont.* 1, 2, 5 (*forsitan quaeras*); *Fast.* 3, 3 (*forsitan roges*); Iuv. 1, 150 (*dicas forsitan*); Liv. 31, 31, 19 (*forsitan dicatis*, upon which Weissenborn makes the comment “*fast = si forte dicatis*”); and many other places where the relation is the same, though the phraseology is not so exactly parallel to that of the *roget quis* or *aliquis dicat* type. Mr. Elmer accordingly is in the position of treating parallel phrases, employed in parallel relations, in entirely different ways. Yet see how sure he is (cf. footnote 2 on p. 140, above) that, on account of their parallelism, *aliquis dixerit* and *fortasse aliquis dixerit* must be exactly alike in modal force!¹

3. On page 195, in treating the examples with *aliquis dicat*, Mr. Elmer says, “No instance of such a subjunctive can be found where the apodosis is not distinctly felt. If the Latin subjunctive has the power of expressing the idea of ‘may (possibly),’ how does it happen that it has this power only when the speaker wishes to treat the possibility as a protasis which an apodosis is to follow?”

Mr. Elmer gets his collection of examples of this type from Roby. “There are,” he says on p. 191, “eight such passages (and only eight, if we may trust Roby) in Latin literature.” The condition “if we may trust Roby,” ought to be kept in mind throughout Mr. Elmer’s reasoning, and his final conclusions should have this reservation appended; for it is a rash thing to hazard all one’s fortunes on the completeness of any collection that is in all probability incomplete. Mr. Elmer certainly ought not, after expressing himself in so reserved and dispassionate a manner on the page quoted, to work himself up, in only four pages, to a pitch of certainty at which he can say, p. 195, “no instance of such a Subjunctive *can be found* where the apodosis is not distinctly felt.” He should confine himself to saying that none *has yet been found*.¹ At a later day, somebody may discover one. Indeed, there is, in my own chance collection, such a case (according to the text of the more recent editors), evidently not known to

¹ Mr. Roby’s own statement, *Grammar*, II, p. ci, is quite calm, namely, “the only tolerably clear instances of *dicat* which I have found are,” etc.

Mr. Elmer ; namely, in Ovid, *Am.* 3, 15, 11. The passage runs as follows : " And some stranger, looking at the walls of wet Sulmo, which enclose few acres of ground, may say ' ye walls, that had the power to produce so great a poet, I call you great, however small your compass.' " ¹ The phrase is *aliquis dicat*. But there is no reply of which to make an apodosis. The poet turns at once to an address to Cupid and Venus. The passage then, if the reading is right, destroys Mr. Elmer's contention. Unfortunately the MSS. P and R lack the passage. F, however, the best representative of the next best class, has it, and reads *dicat*, as do five other MSS. referred to without definite names by Ehwald. Doubtless Merkel's *dicit* is based upon a reading actually found by him ; but the MSS. from which he took it must have been of a class inferior to F. The mediaeval correctors of the text of Ovid were especially fond of changing Subjunctives to Indicatives. As regards inherent probability, *dicat*, — which would here have to be a true Potential, — fits the context better than the Future Indicative. " Some one may say this of Sulmo " seems a more natural idea than " some will say it." If one were going to use the Future Indicative, some such word as *hospes* 'the stranger' (without *aliquis*), or *plurimus* 'many a man,' ² would seem more natural than *aliquis hospes*. But, at any rate, Mr. Elmer is standing on not very comfortable ground in having F and the recent editors against him. I am inclined to think, too, that the example *aliquis dubitasset*, Cic. *Brut.* 50, 189, is a true Potential, and so another engine to dislodge him from his position. The passage runs as follows : " When would any of our ancestors, having it in his power to choose an advocate, have hesitated about taking

¹ Atque aliquis spectans hospes Sulmonis aquosi
 Moenia, quae campi iugera pauca tenent,
 'Quae tantum' dicat ' potuistis ferre poetam,
 Quantulacumque estis, vos ego magna voco.'
 Culte puer puerique parens Amathusia culti,
 Aurea de campo vellite signa meo!

² Cf. Horace's *plurimus* in Iunonis honorem aptum dicet equis Argos, *Carm.* 1, 7, 8.

either Antonius or Crassus? There were others in abundance; still, (while) one *might have hesitated* which of the two to take, there was no one who would not have taken one or the other of them." The meaning "some one *would have been* in doubt" seems to me unnatural here. But Mr. Elmer cannot resort to the device of taking *aliquis dubitasset* as a Volitive Condition, since nothing follows of which a Conclusion could be made. The only remaining solution is to regard the construction as Potential. And I have little doubt that other examples of like kind with these two are waiting for some one to note them.

4. Mr. Elmer has proceeded in the wrong order in making up his mind about the *aliquis dixerit* type, in which the form is ambiguous, and then proceeding to the *aliquis dicat* type, in which the form is clear. Probably in consequence of this wrong order, he has led himself into an untenable inference with regard to the former. Certainly the unmodified *aliquis dixerit* and the unmodified *aliquis dicat* or *dicit* stand a little nearer to each other in type than do the unmodified *aliquis dixerit* and the modified *fortasse aliquis dixerit*; and, if one is to venture upon any inference at all, it should be on the basis of the first pair rather than of the second pair. Now Mr. Elmer cites (from Roby) fifty examples of the Future Indicative with *aliquis* or an equivalent, as against eight examples of the Subjunctive type, seven of which, namely all that are not modified by any adverb, he regards as Volitive. The conclusion which he ought to draw, if any is drawn, is, not that all the examples with the ambiguous form *dixerit* are Future Perfect Indicatives, but that probably about 7/50 of them are Subjunctives, and the rest Indicatives; and that *a sure pronunciamento is impossible in the case of any individual example.*

5. On the same page (195), Mr. Elmer says "if the Latin Subjunctive has the power of expressing the idea of 'may (possibly),' . . . why is it that this subjunctive is not occasionally used to indicate mere possibility (without such implications), — to express such ideas as, *e.g.*, 'it may perhaps happen,' 'it may be true,' 'he may perhaps be at home,'

it may rain,' and hundreds of other similar ideas that are constantly meeting us in every period of the literature? Why in such cases do we invariably have *potest fieri, uerum esse potest, domi esse potest, pluere potest*, etc., etc., and not once *fiat, uerum sit, domi sit, pluat*, etc., etc.?'" Mr. Elmer seems to regard it as impossible that a construction once freely used should become limited in its functions. Yet he will find that in Greek the Volitive Subjunctive is in free use in certain dependent constructions, while its independent use is restricted to a narrow field. Or, again, he will find that the Anticipatory Subjunctive is in free use in dependent constructions, while the independent use is already exceptional in Homeric Greek, and has wholly disappeared before the times of the Attic literature. To my mind, nothing is more natural than that a modal use once common should be largely superseded by exactly expressed periphrases like *potest fieri ut, potest esse*, etc., maintaining its ground, in independent sentences, only where there is a certain suggestiveness in an accompanying word, or in the person employed, as in the list of classical constructions of the Independent Latin Potential given at the end of this article.

6. The reference to Greek brings us to a point of larger bearing. The principle on which Mr. Elmer has been proceeding is enunciated by him on pp. 190 and 191, as follows: "No separate division should be made, or recognized, for a mood, unless there is at least one passage, somewhere in the literature, that cannot be satisfactorily explained in any other way. As applied to the case in hand, this principle may be stated as follows: If there is not at least one instance of the subjunctive mood that can be explained in no other way than by supposing it to have the force of 'may (possibly),' or at least an instance that can be better explained by supposing it to have such a force than by explaining it according to some one of the recognized and indisputable uses of that mood, then there is no justification, or excuse, for supposing it to have that force." A little later in the same paragraph the statement is made still stronger by being weakened in its conditions, so that it reads, "if every instance will make

equally good sense by treating it as belonging to one of the indisputable uses, then surely there should not be the slightest hesitation in assigning it to one of the latter classes. I do not [Mr. Elmer adds] see how there can be two opinions on this point."

Such a condition of things would, I think, hardly arise. Yet the canon, *qua* canon, has an innocent, and even admirable, lock. None the less, it proceeds from a radically false conception of the proper method of approach in the study of syntactical problems. I do not mean merely that the adoption of such a principle strongly tempts workers, as it has successfully tempted Mr. Elmer (witness his translation of *describat*), to apply the method long ago devised, in another sphere of activity, by a Greek adapter and simplifier named Procrustes. I do not even mean merely that the adoption of such a principle makes workers blind to the significance of the actual facts found in dependent clauses. In *potest fieri ut pluat*, e.g., no origin except a potential one is possible for the dependent member. The construction cannot mean, or ever have meant, "it is possible to happen that it would surely rain." It must have come down from a paratactic stage in which the meaning was "it may rain: that can happen"; and it accordingly bears witness that once, at any rate, the Latin Subjunctive could be used independently to express Possibility. But if this is so, then to prove that "every instance will make equally good sense by treating it as belonging to one of the indisputable uses," is not to reach the conclusion that "there should not be the slightest hesitation in assigning it to one of the latter classes," but simply to reach the conclusion that the evidence *does not warrant the drawing of any conclusion*; that the examples in question may, or may not, be *relics of any earlier use* grown nearly obsolete. I do not mean either of these two things, though both are bad enough. The fault lies deeper still, and is, I am sorry to say, firmly rooted, as a matter of fact, in the ordinary procedure which has obtained in the investigation of the syntax of the Latin verb, and, to a very large extent, of the syntax of the Greek verb. Latinists, for example, have withdrawn into

their studies, and, having apparently removed all Greek and Sanskrit books, and the like, from the room, have speculated about Latin pure and simple; or, if they have bethought them of a possible means of defending a tenet by a reference to Greek, they have been content, without independent reading, to turn to some book of reference, and thence cite an example as similar or not similar. Thus Mr. Elmer, in maintaining his theory that the Subjunctive of Obligation or Propriety is derived from the Subjunctive of Contingent Futurity, and not from the Volitive, cites from Goodwin's *Moods and Tenses* the Optative example, *Il.* 2, 250: $\tau\hat{\omega} \text{ οὐκ } \grave{\alpha}\nu \beta\alphaσιλη\grave{\eta}as \grave{\alpha}\nu\grave{\alpha} \sigma\tau\grave{\omega}\mu' \grave{\epsilon}\chi\omega\tau \grave{\alpha}\gamma\grave{o}pe\grave{\epsilon}\omega\grave{\iota}s$, "you should not speak having kings in your mouth"; while Mr. Bennett, in refuting Mr. Elmer, has nothing more to say on this point than that, "so far as he can find, Elmer is alone in his interpretation of this passage," and that "Goodwin, *Moods and Tenses*, § 237, to which Elmer refers, says that probably it has the force of a mild command." It would appear that these scholars do not read Greek literature for themselves in connection with their study of Latin Syntax; for any reader may easily find at least several interrogative examples in the Subjunctive, and a dozen examples, partly interrogative, but mostly declarative, in the Optative, expressing Obligation or Propriety; though Mr. Elmer's inference about the origin of the construction would still not follow. Thus, again, Mr. Bennett, in the Appendix to his *Latin Grammar*, says, §§ 325, 326, and 328, "Genitive with Memini, Reminiscor, Obliviscor.—With verbs of *remembering* the use of the Genitive apparently comes from associating the verb with *memor*. Thus *memini* was felt as *memor sum*. Obliviscor followed the analogy of its opposite, *memini*. Cf. English *differ with* after the analogy of *agree with*.—Genitive with *Admoneo*, etc.—Here the verb of *reminding* was probably felt as equivalent to *aliquem memorem reddere*, and was construed with the Genitive on this principle.—Genitive with *Pudet*, *Paenitet*, etc. The Genitive here is held to depend upon the noun notion implied in the verb. Thus *pudet* suggests *pudor*; *paenitet*, *paenitentia*; *miseret*, *misericordia*, etc."

There is here (though Mr. Bennett's Appendix is addressed to teachers and advanced students) no hint that the construction after *memini*, *reminiscor*, *obliviscor*, *admoneo*, etc., is descended from the parent speech (it has come down not only in Latin, but in Greek, Sanskrit, Avestan, German, Lithuanian, and Servian). The form of Mr. Bennett's statement clearly implies that these constructions originated within the Latin language. The least that he should have done was to say that, in the parent speech, the use of the Genitive with verbs *corresponding to memini*, etc., came from associating these verbs with adjectives *corresponding to memor*, etc.¹ But it is hardly probable that, after a serious study of all the inherited constructions of the Genitive, in various languages, in dependence upon verbs, he would adopt solutions of this character, even for the constructions with *pudet*, etc. Neither Delbrück nor Brugmann takes such a course. Or, finally, let us see how Mr. Elmer and Mr. Bennett treat, in the light of comparative syntax, the construction with which we are now dealing. On p. 197 Mr. Elmer says, "Whether such a use of the optative does, or does not, exist in Greek would have to be determined by a careful investigation, but I strongly suspect that the Potential Optative in Greek rests upon the same footing as the Potential Subjunctive in Latin, so far as the ideas 'may' and 'can' are concerned. Even if there are indisputable instances of the Greek optative in the sense of 'may possibly' (which I doubt, if they are tested in the same manner as I have tested supposed similar instances in Latin), that could have little or no weight in determining the force of the Latin expressions we have been considering, under the condition of things that I have shown to exist in the latter language." Mr. Bennett, in his answer, makes no mention of Greek at all. Now Latin Syntax is, of course,

¹ This, however, would not, in my opinion, be true. On the contrary, I hope in an early paper to point out, in some detail, that the inherited genitives after verbs like *memini*, nouns like *memoria*, and adjectives like *memor*, stand on an equal footing with one another; and that the first, instead of being derived from an objective genitive use, is itself, in connection with the others, a large factor in the bringing about of that use.

in its main features, as much an inheritance from the parent speech as are Latin forms. Let us see how this procedure would sound, if carried over into the province of Formenlehre. Supposing the professor of Comparative Philology in any university were to express his opinion about the origin of a certain series of Latin forms, and were then to add that he had not considered the series of Greek forms generally regarded as of the same nature, but that he strongly suspected that they rested upon the same foundation as the Latin forms, and could be explained in the same manner, and that, even if they could not so be explained, they could have little or no weight in determining the origin of the Latin forms he had been considering, under the condition of things which he had shown to exist in the latter language; and supposing then that some other professor of Comparative Philology had in his answer paid no attention to this statement, and had himself reached an opinion without any consideration of the facts existing in Greek or any other language outside of Latin. We should all, unquestionably, think this a remarkable procedure, but should have no interest in results thus obtained. But it would be no more remarkable than the procedure narrated above, and there would be equal reason for confidence in its outcome.

Now, lest I be thought to be personal, I hasten to say that I have simply taken these instances of wrong method as easily accessible texts, and that my sermon—if in the brevity of human life I may be pardoned for saying without waste of time what I think—is of pretty general application, in all countries. To a certain extent, there has been consideration of other languages in the treatment of the syntax of the Cases in our school grammars, though sometimes, apparently, rather as afterthought and for grace of ornament than as a real help in the study of the problems. But I know of no Latin grammar in the world in which the treatment of the Moods is steadily based upon comparative study. Neither is there as yet any recognition, *in practice*, that the treatment *ought* to be based on such study. Consider the arrangement recently made for the editorship of the division on Syntax

in the great Historical Latin Grammar planned by our colleagues in Germany. Dittmar has been chosen to do the work. Now I can forgive Dittmar for having, as they say, overthrown my doctrine of the Cum-Constructions, "as Hale had overthrown that of Hoffman and Lübbert," especially as I hope sometime to show that the structure which I built still stands, *aere perennius*. But I cannot forgive him for the way in which he goes at his task. I do not refer to the use which he makes of this same Procrustes' bed, *i.e.*, to the miracle which he works in deriving, in the mental processes of the Roman, the idea of exhortation, of command, of wish, of an historical fact narrated in a cum-clause, and the like, from that of something so "absurd," "unbegreiflich," or "gegen seine Ehre," "das sich sein Inneres dagegen auflehnte." I refer now only to the way in which he makes his start upon the solution of his problem. The Latin Subjunctive he finds to be originally "polemical." But what is the Latin Subjunctive? It is of course a mixed set of forms, partly Subjunctive and partly Optative, inheriting the powers of both moods. It is, in short, of *two* origins. Very good. Did both these moods originally express the polemical idea? If so, why were there two moods to express one and the same idea? Did the Subjunctive express polemics and the Optative something else, or *vice versa*, and if so, *what was that something else?* These two simple questions are immediately fatal to Dittmar's whole system. And this mortal weakness is due simply to the fact that Dittmar either, having fairly conceived the idea of Comparative Syntax, has rejected it,—which is not credible,—or that he has never fairly conceived it, that, in effect, he opens only his Latin books when he is constructing Latin Syntax.¹ Yet,

¹ Near the conclusion, Dittmar has, to be sure, an "Ausblick" of two and a half pages upon the constructions of the Subjunctive in Oscan and Umbrian, and as many upon the constructions of the Subjunctive and Optative in Greek (to Latin, he has devoted three hundred and twenty-two pages). The conclusion of a book is a curious place in which to put evidence upon fundamental meanings which one has set out in the beginning to detect. The bringing in of Greek at this point, and in this quantity, has the air of being for ornament, rather than of arising from a conviction with regard to method. Had there been such a con-

in the very birthplace of Comparative Phonology, Comparative Formenlehre, and Comparative Syntax, he is chosen to write the Syntax for the great historical grammar! Have Delbrück and Brugmann, so far as this generation is concerned, lived so nearly in vain? There stands Delbrück's work on the Syntax of the Subjunctive and Optative in Greek and Sanskrit, now nearly thirty years old,—to say nothing of his later more general syntactical work, happily completed in the present year. There stands, in solitary distinction, Brugmann's Greek Grammar, now fifteen years old, and in a third edition, but founded from the beginning, in the Syntax as well as elsewhere, upon comparative study. Where, unless it be in the new Grammar just announced from England,¹ is there another Greek Grammar of the kind? Where is there a single Latin Grammar? These statements and questions do not condemn individuals, and must not be so interpreted. No man can be blamed for not seeing something which, though obvious, has not dawned upon his age. But the age, in the mass, is to be blamed, and to be wondered at. Wondered at, too, it will be. In a short time, the state of affairs that has so long existed will seem as strange to us as the old doctrine now seems that Latin was derived from Greek. In a short time, it will be recognized that Comparative Syntax is as much a part of Comparative Philology as is Comparative Phonology or Comparative Formenlehre. In

viction, the mere sight of the two names Subjunctive and Optative should have been enough to remind the writer that the parent language had these two moods, which Latin must have inherited; and he would thus have been kept from the false path at the end of which his whole system has been constructed.

¹ Even the more advanced books professedly dealing with Comparative Grammar have generally omitted Syntax without even a mention. King and Cookson's *Comparative Grammar of Greek and Latin*, 1890, forms an exception, and the work of the authors is based upon a sound general idea; but the briefly treated Syntax involves no searching study of either Greek or Latin. Miles's bold and somewhat whimsical *Comparative Syntax of Greek and Latin* has not yet advanced to the methodical treatment of the verb. Riemann and Goelzer's *Grammaire Comparée du Grec et du Latin*, on the other hand, treats all parts of the Syntax with fulness, and, though far from final, will undoubtedly do much to bring about a popular interest in Comparative Syntax, and a recognition of its necessity.

a short time, it will be felt that, for any language, a treatment of Syntax not founded upon comparative study morally belongs, whatever its chronology, to the days before the discovery of Sanskrit.

Let us see, now, what light comparative study may throw upon Mr. Elmer's contention.

Greek has an abundance of examples which plain people would classify as true Potentials, *e.g.*, *Il.* 2, 12, *νῦν γάρ κεν ἔλοι,* “for now he might take the wide-streeted city of the Trojans”; *Od.* 12, 101, *καί κεν διοϊστεύσεις,* “the second cliff which you will see will be lower, Odysseus. They are close together; one might even shoot across.”¹ But Mr. Elmer is proof against such examples, for he would translate them by “he would succeed in taking if he should try,” “one would succeed in shooting across if one should try.” We are brought, then, in the hope of convincing him, to the examples apparently corresponding to *aliquis dicat*. They take two forms in Greek, the Optative, as in *φαίη ἀν τις*, *Plat. Rep.* 416 c, or *τάχ' ἀν τις εἴποι*, *Aesch. Sept.* 913, and the Anticipatory Subjunctive *εἴπησι*, *Od.* 6, 275, and elsewhere.

Mr. Elmer cannot take the *εἴπησι* examples as Volitive Suppositions, since Greek does not use the Volitive in positive expressions in the second or third person, barring perhaps three, or possibly four, instances in the whole body of the literature and the inscriptions. He may, to be sure, partly unify his procedure by taking them as examples of Contingent Futurity, not of the “would” kind, but of another—namely, an Anticipatory—kind; or he may simply say—and this would be true—that they mean in effect “will say,” and so correspond to *aliquis dicet* in Latin. But I should think he would lament the necessity, after having explained seven of his eight Latin examples as Volitive, and only one as an expression of Contingent Futurity, to be forced to reverse his procedure so completely in Greek, and flee to the interpretation of all

¹ Cf. *Od.* 3, 231, *ρέα θέον γ' ἐθέλων καὶ τηλόθεν ἀνδρα σαώσαι* (translated “easily may” by Palmer, and “lightly might” by Butcher and Lang), with its antithesis in the same passage, *Od.* 3, 236, *ἀλλ' οὐ τοι θάνατον μὲν ὅμοιον οὐδὲ θεοί περ καὶ φίλω ἀνδρι δύνανται ἀλαλκέμεν.*

the Homeric examples with the Subjunctive as expressions of something *not* Volitive. Still, escape is in this way possible for him. From the difficulty offered by the *φαίη ἀν τις* type, on the other hand, no refuge is afforded by any of the interpretations set up for the Latin examples in his paper. To avoid the Potential idea in the *dicat* of *dicat fortassis aliquis* he has put the entire Potential feeling into the *fortassis*, making the Subjunctive itself mean "would say." *Tάχ' ἀν τις εἴποι* can be managed by him in the same way, the *ἀν* *εἴποι* being taken to mean "would say," while *τάχα*, getting a secondary force corresponding to that of *fortassis*, means "perhaps." But he cannot so dispose of examples without *τάχα*. By his own statement about *dicat fortassis aliquis*, *ἀν φαίη* cannot mean "may say," but must mean "would say." But such a meaning is out of place in the context. If any kind of certainty is to be expressed, it would be the kind expressed by the Future Indicative. Nothing is left, therefore, but to take *ἀν φαίη* as Volitive. But this is impossible, since it is not in the Subjunctive. Instead, then, of resting upon the same footing, as Mr. Elmer "strongly suspects" they do, as the Latin Potentials, as explained away by him, the Greek examples as a whole absolutely refuse to stand upon such a footing, and Mr. Elmer will accordingly be obliged to fall back upon the alternative part of his statement, namely that they can "have little or no weight in determining the force of the Latin expressions he has been considering." To my mind, however, they have much weight. It is of course not a certainty that a given Latin construction is identical with a Greek construction to which it seems exactly to correspond; but there is nevertheless a great probability that it is, and, unless rebutting evidence can be found, there is nothing to do but to classify it on the basis of that probability. There is of course the possibility, which I shall not now weigh, that the construction in *aliquis dicat* and the like is due to a fusion of an Anticipatory Subjunctive idiom corresponding to *εἴπησι* with a Potential Optative idiom corresponding to *ἀν φαίη* or *ἀν εἴποι*. But at any rate the construction was, to the Roman consciousness, Potential, and

was only one of a number of allied constructions. These independent Potentials are not infrequent, but they all (until after Cicero's time) fall within a few definite categories, which, in the printed syllabus used in my teaching, I have arranged (with one slight difference) as follows:—

1. Negative Statements, and Questions implying a negative.
2. Statements in the Second Person Singular Indefinite.
3. Statements with *quis* or *aliquis* for subject, occurring only in a few phrases, mostly with a verb of saying or asking.
4. Statements modified by *vix* or *facile*.
5. Statements modified by *forsitan*, and, rarely, statements modified by *fortasse*. The former of course were originally indirect Potential questions, but, when the words *fors sit an* became one adverbial mass, must themselves have come to be felt as independent.¹

¹ Mr. Elmer's explanation of these Subjunctives as indirect questions of the ordinary kind (see his footnote on pp. 178, 179) will not account for the present tenses when referring to the future, as in *forsitan requiras*, *Aen.* 2, 506; for in such indirect questions the future idea is expressed by a periphrastic form. If all references to the future after *forsitan* were expressed as in *Cic. Att.* 12, 18, 1 (*quae res forsitan sit refricatura vulnus meum*), this explanation would serve. But they are not.

Neither can I agree with Mr. Elmer's reasonings or statements (2) and (3) in the footnote beginning on p. 177. I reprint these in part, with comments.

"(2) If in *forsitan* the *an* was felt as introducing a question after a present tense (*sit*), we should then expect it to be followed only by the present and perfect tenses (for the rule for the sequence of tenses still seems to be in force, despite the assaults that have been made upon it). And this is exactly what we find. The use of any other tense with *forsitan* is as rare as it is with other forms of indirect questions after a primary tense. In fact, I can find none at all except in *Cic. De Or.* II, 45, 189 and *Verg. Georg.* IV, 116, and even here the imperfect refers to present time, forming apodoses contrary to fact in the present. . . ."

By the use of Merguet's Lexicons to Cicero's Orations and Philosophical Works, Mr. Elmer might have found two more cases of the imperfect Subjunctive with *forsitan* (*Rosc. Com.* 16, 47; *Verr.* 2, 65, 159); and one of the Pluperfect (*Off.* 1, 31, 112); and Sjöstrand's "*Quibus temporibus modisque quamvis, nescio an, forsitan, similes voces utantur*" (1891) would have yielded him forty-seven more examples of the one tense or the other, from Ovid, Livy, Quintilian, and later writers. In these examples it is true, as Mr. Elmer says it is in his two examples, that a conclusion contrary to fact is expressed, so that the Subjunctive would in

The general view which Mr. Elmer expresses about the ultimate passage of *forsitan* into an adverb, with a corresponding freedom in the mood of the verb, seems to me natural and sound; as does also the view that (where not necessary for inherent reasons) the Subjunctive with *fortasse*, as in *erraverim fortasse*, Plin. *Ep.* 1, 23, 2, is due to the influence of the Subjunctive with *forsitan*. But in his treatment of this last type, Mr. Elmer has again, without actually making sure of his ground, expressed himself in sweeping language that does not correspond to the facts. In the article already cited from the *Cl. R.*, p. 220, he says (the italics are mine), "if I am not mistaken, this *erraverim* has been responsible for much mischief. *I believe it to be the only instance of the kind in Latin literature*—the only one that apparently gives (and only apparently, I think) justification for the claim that the perfect subjunctive *fecerim* may mean 'I may (perhaps) have done.' *Certainly none other occurs before the period of*

any case have to be used. I have thus added to the material which he believes to make for his inference. But I do not feel the certainty of that inference. All but the five examples from Cicero are from later authors, who used the Indicative as freely as the Subjunctive, in any tense, after *forsitan*. In view of the fact that an Imperfect or Pluperfect Subjunctive with *forsitan* might easily be mistaken at first reading for a conclusion contrary to fact, it does not seem to me strange that these authors, where they wanted to express a past situation, preferred to use the perfectly safe Imperfect or Pluperfect Indicative, as they did in at least the seven Indicative cases cited by Sjöstrand. As for Cicero, he had *fortasse* (with the Indicative) at hand with which to avoid a similar confusion, and used it at least in *Div.* 1, 49, 112; *Rep.* 2, 34, 59; *Sest.* 57, 121 (but the text is doubtful); *Claud.* 51, 141; *Phil.* 2, 42, 108.

"(3) Another indication that the interrogative force of the *an* in *forsitan* long continued to be distinctly felt is that, while *fortasse* was at all periods freely used to modify adjectives, adverbs, prepositional phrases, etc., *forsitan* was till late times used only with verbs. This strict use of *forsitan* is violated only once (*Sall. Jug.* 106, 3) before the time of *Livy*. . . ." To this, Mr. Elmer adds (*Cl. R.* XIV, 4, p. 222): "To the evidence there presented should be added the further fact that *forsitan* could, until comparatively late times, be used only before its verb, as would be expected if the *an* were still felt as governing the verb."

The first statement is inaccurate. Merguet, again, would have shown Mr. Elmer that Cicero used *forsitan* at least once with only very remote connection with a verb, namely, in *Phil.* 3, 11, 29, *multi . . . perspsi sumus, alii spe forsitan reciprandae libertatis, alii vivendi nimia cupiditate*. A similar example is to be found in Varro, *L. L.* 9, 60. The second statement is likewise inaccurate. In *Verr.* 5, 2, 4, Cicero has *quod debeam forsitan obtinere*.

decline." In view of this and the several other instances of errors of fact which I have had occasion to point out, curiosity is awakened as to the way in which Mr. Elmer, in general, gets his facts or his beliefs. One ought not to "believe" an example to be "the only instance of the kind in Latin literature," unless one has oneself read the whole of Latin literature for the purpose of finding out, or can cite some trusty person who has done so. Neither should one feel certain that "none other occurs before the period of decline," unless one can cite similar evidence for this more limited range. As in the case of the *aliquis dicat* collection, non-existence of examples cannot be surely inferred from the fact that the grammars do not contain them. Mr. Elmer's excess of zeal is, moreover, entirely unnecessary in the present case, since the explanation which he gives for the example from Pliny would equally well account for any number of examples for any time after Cicero,—and, indeed, for any number in Cicero himself, provided a large number of Indicative examples also remained. As a matter of fact, the Pseud.-Quintil. *Declamations*, which, whatever their date, come under the head of "Latin literature," alone afford *nine* examples of the Perfect Subjunctive with *fortasse*, given (since the publication of Mr. Elmer's study) by Mr. Clement in Cl. R. XIV, 4; namely (Ritter's text, p.), 183, 3; 69, 13; 159, 2; 171, 14; 182, 27; 184, 8; 328, 27; 344, 1; 379, 15. As for Latin literature "before the period of decline," Sjöstrand, in the monograph already cited, gives two sure examples from the *Institutes* of Quintilian, namely 1, *prooem.* 19, *qualis fortasse nemo adhuc fuerit*, and 10, 1, 107, *et fortasse epilogos illi mos civitatis abstulerit*. He also gives an example from Cicero which seems to me to be properly taken as Potential, namely, *Verr. 2, 5, 15, nam quod fortasse non nemo vestrum audierit*. . . . I am inclined, further, to accept some of his examples for the Present Subjunctive. In *Verr. 5, 3, 7, videatur in durum hoc fortasse videatur* would most naturally be taken as Potential. So, it seems to me, would it in *Fam. 7, 2, 3, in vix veri simile fortasse videatur*; while in *Brut. 91, 313*, and *Fam. 1, 7, 2* it

might without forcing be taken as expressing "Contingent Futurity." In view of these facts, I am inclined to place the natural rise of the use of the Subjunctive with *fortasse* at an earlier date than Mr. Elmer does.¹

Whatever may be the date, however, there can be but one reasonable force to attach to the mood itself in examples like Pliny's *erraverim fortasse*, *Ep.* 1, 23, 2; *tu fortasse me putas indulsisse amori meo*, 1, 14, 10; *hebetentur fortasse et paulum retundantur*, 3, 15, 4; and *non vis in te ea laudari, nec fortasse laudanda sint*, *Pan.* 42. The mood itself, apart from the adverb, must mean something; and that something is pretty sure to be a conception colored by the presence of the *fortasse*,—in other words, the conception of a *Possibility* (the Subjunctive meaning "may," to match the adverb's force of "perhaps"). No other hypothesis could give a differentiation between *erraverim fortasse* and *erravi fortasse*. So, then, even if Mr. Elmer had succeeded in proving that no Potential existed in Latin in Cicero's time, we should be obliged to hold that a Potential had accidentally come into being a century or more later.

The reading *fors et maneant*, in Hor. *Carm.* 1, 28, 31, seems to me probably sound, and the example a sufficiently natural one for a poet. With regard to Pliny's *dicat fortassis aliquis*, *N.H.* 36, 2, 2, our ignorance of the origin of *fortassis* makes an exact opinion of the relation of *fortassis* and *dicat* impossible; but the latter is at any rate Potential. *Fuat in fors fuat an, and sit in forsitan* and in Horace's *forsit* (or *fors sit*) *honorem iure mihi invideat quivis*, *Sat.* 1, 6, 50, are of Potential origin. As to *invideat*, that might be in the Subjunctive of "Contingent Futurity" ("would perhaps envy me with good reason"); but it lies at least very close to the line of the Potential.

To the independent constructions now given should in strictness be added that of the Subjunctive with *utinam*, *ut*, or *qui*, expressing a wish or imprecation. This Subjunctive, like the corresponding Greek construction with $\pi\omega\varsigma \; \ddot{\alpha}v$,

¹ In *Pseud.* 888, Ritschl and his successors rightly follow A in reading *credis* against the *credas* of the other MSS.

originally meant "how might? ", and was a true Potential.¹ To the Roman consciousness, however, it probably seemed a mere Optative Subjunctive.

In dependent constructions the Potential has a few occasional uses, and one very frequent one, namely, the one numbered 6.

1. In early Latin, Indirect Questions of Possibility after *fors fuat an*. An example survives in Plaut. *Pseud.* 432 (*sint A B. sunt rel.*). To the same head belongs the Subjunctive after the phrase (*fors sit an*) out of which *forsitan* has grown, the Subjunctive after the rare *fortasse an*, and the Subjunctive (with no sure case in early Latin) after *forsan*.

2. Potential *quod*-Clauses of the Limits within Which, in expressions like *quod sine molestia tua fiat*, as in Cic. *Fam.* 13, 23, 2 : *pergratum mihi feceris, si eum, quod sine molestia tua fiat, iuveris*, "you will oblige me much, if you will assist him, as far as may be possible without inconvenience to yourself." Compare the expression of the same idea by the use of *possum* in *Att.* 1, 6, 7 : *quae tibi mandavi velim cures, quod sine molestia tua facere poteris*, "I should like you to carry out the commissions I have given you, so far as it shall be possible to do so without inconvenience to yourself."

3. Clauses of a Possibility Suggested in order to be Rejected, as in Cic. *Verr.* 5, 68, 175 : *quod enim te liberatum iam existimationis metu cogites, mihi crede*, "for as to your possibly thinking that you are now freed from fear of popular opinion, believe me." . . . Similarly Ter. *Ad.* 163, *Andr.* 395, etc.

4. Result-Clauses of Possibility or Capacity with *ut* or *ut*

¹ This is a view which I have had in print since 1893, in the syllabus already referred to, and have taught from a much earlier time ; but Goelzer, at least, has anticipated me in point of publication. See Riemann-Goelzer, *Grammaire Comparée du Grec et du Latin* (1897), § 335, Rem. 1. Riemann, in both editions of his *Syntaxe Latine*, 1886 and 1890, had rightly interpreted the construction as interrogative, and had translated by "comment pourrait-il bien arriver que . . . ?" But he had apparently thought of the mood as truly Optative. Lindsay, *A Short Historical Latin Grammar* (1895), p. 141, still explains *ut* as "the conjunction . . . , with suppression of the idea 'I wish' or 'do thou grant.' "

Neither Riemann nor Goelzer points out the correspondence of the Latin construction to the Greek one with $\pi\omega\varsigma \delta\nu$, though Goelzer may well have had it in mind.

non, as in Heaut. 304: mulier lacrimis opplet os totum sibi, ut facile scires desiderio id fieri, “the woman’s face was flooded with tears, so that one could easily see that the cause was her longing for you.”

5. Potential Substantive Clauses after *fieri potest* and the like, as in Cic. *Tusc.* 1, 3, 6: *fieri autem potest ut recte quis sentiat, et id quod sentit polite eloqui non possit,* “but it may happen that a man may think properly, and yet be unable to express his thoughts in a finished manner.”

6. Potential Characterizing Clauses (or Clauses of Capacity, Availability, etc.) after negative statements or indefinite positive statements expressing or implying existence (*est, sunt, habeo*, etc.), as in Ter. *Ad. 121, dis gratia, est unde haec fiant,* “thank Heaven, I have means with which it can all be done (cf. Caes. *B. G.* 1, 28, 3, *domi nihil erant, quo famem tolerarent*); Caes. *B. G.* 1, 6, 1, *erant omnino itinera duo, quibus itineribus domo exire possent; unum per Sequanos, angustum et difficile, vix qua singuli carri ducerentur,* “there were in all but two ways, by which it was possible for them to leave their country: one through the territory of the Sequani, a narrow and difficult one, by which carts could with difficulty be taken in single file”; Cic. *Cat.* 1, 10, 26, *habes ubi ostentes tuam illam praeclararam patientiam,* “you have an opportunity for showing that famous endurance of yours” (cf. Cic. *Arch.* 6, 12, *suppeditat ubi reficiatur;* Caes. *B. G.* 4, 38, 2, *cum quo se recipieren non haberent*).

In my “Cum-Constructions,” pp. 106, 107 (120 of the German edition), I proposed, without argument, the recognition of this distinct type of characterizing Clauses, along with two others. My belief in the probable soundness of this classification has not changed, though Elmer, who for a time accepted it (as in his edition of the *Phormio*, note to 488, and in Bennett’s Appendix), has abandoned it.¹ The considerations which influence me are as follows:—

(a) Given a free Potential use of the Optative, such as

¹ On p. 196 Mr. Elmer says: “In my treatment of Relative Clauses in the Appendix to Bennett’s Latin Grammar, I have (§ 404, 2) classed the subordinate clause in *est unde fiat* as coming from an independent potential *fiat*, ‘it may be

beyond doubt existed in the parent speech, a dependent clause of this kind would inevitably come into existence at whatever point hypotaxis arose. To an “it may be done” or “can be done,” there would certainly in time be a corresponding “there are means by which it may be done” or “can be done.” The construction is in extremely common use in Greek, as in the following: *οὐδέ οἱ ἄλλοι εἴσοι, οἵ κεν κατὰ δῆμον ἀλάλκοιεν κακότητα*, “and others he has none, who, throughout the people, might ward off evil from him,” *Od.* 4, 166. *οὐ γάρ οἱ πάρα νῆσοι ἐπήρετμοι καὶ ἑταῖροι, οἵ κεν μιν πέμποιεν ἐπ’ εὐρέα νῶτα θαλάσσης*, “for he has no ships with oars, and no companions that might send him on his way over the broad back of the sea,” *Od.* 17, 145. A similar interpretation gives a perfect account of Latin examples like those cited above.

(b) Latin examples of the type in question find frequent parallels in periphrases with *posset*, *possent*, etc. Thus in the example from Caesar above, *vix qua ducerentur* (Potential) corresponds in the sum total of its meaning to *quibus exire possent*, in which the idea of Potentiality (belonging, not to the mood, but to the inherent meaning of the verb *possum*) is forced upon us by the examples without a form of *possum*. In *ducerentur*, accordingly, the Potential idea lies in the mood itself. Compare also, with *est unde haec fiant* from Terence, the example *unde agger omnino comportari posset, nihil erat reliquum*, from Caes., *B. C.* 2, 15, 1.

One consideration, however, remains to be weighed. Alongside of the idiom illustrated above, Greek has also a use of the *Subjunctive* after a few general phrases of done.’ Further consideration has led me to change my opinion regarding the nature of this clause. The *unde fiant* does not mean ‘by means of which it *may possibly* be done,’ but either ‘by means of which it *may certainly* be done’ (in which case the subjunctive is not potential at all, but volitive, in origin), or possibly, ‘by means of which it would certainly be done.’ At any rate, the expression leaves no room for a possible failure and ‘may possibly’ expresses an idea very remote from that in *fiant*’.

I find myself unable to follow the thought in the second half of this statement. A “may certainly” Volitive is something both difficult and depressing. It looks as if Mr. Elmer were willing to adopt any explanation except a simple and natural one.

existence or non-existence, mainly the latter. In the article on “‘*Extended*’ and ‘*Remote*’ *Deliberatives in Greek*” already referred to, I have given the known examples. A single one will suffice here: *έμοι γὰρ οὐκέτ’ ἔστιν εἰς ὅ τι βλέπω πλὴν σοῦ*, “for now I’ve none to whom to look, save you,” Soph. *Ai.* 514. It is morally certain that such constructions are derived from an original deliberative type, as in the combination “to whom save you shall I look? I have no one.”

It is perfectly possible, and perhaps probable, that Latin had a corresponding idiom. But the fact that Latin had but a single mood for the Subjunctive and the Optative would make this construction, if it existed, indistinguishable from the true Potential construction. In other words, there would be a *fusion* of two constructions, of different origin but similar feeling. This fused construction would nevertheless seem (if it existed) to have been, *to the Roman consciousness*, Potential in feeling, since, as said above, the examples so often find parallels in periphrases containing *posset*, *possent*, etc.